In “The Self We Live By,” many different theories of what the self has been in the past, and what it currently is now are presented. There are those that question whether the “self” is a created by the mind by what we think others think we are (Cooley) or what others label us as (Berger), and there are those that selves can be other-directed (developed as one conforms to the wants and needs of others) or inner-directed (whose conformity is only defined by an underlying framework set by the community with much room to grow), such as Riesman suggests.
Then, while examining the postmodern self, there are theorists like Baudrillard (termed skeptical postmodernists) who believe that nothing is more real than the image which represents it. Therefore, the “me” or the self that we may refer to in regular conversation does not really exist because it is just a compilation of the images that others see us as or the images that we compile to say what we are, and there is no division between what is a represention of something and what is actually real. According to Baudrillard, at least to my understanding, the self has no reality; it is “hyperreal.”
In contrast to the radical view of the skeptical postmodernists, Holstein and Gubrium turn to Lyotard’s definition of the self comes from “’nodal points’ of specific communication circuits.” Each person can lie somewhere along the line of two extremes in many different possible communities, being white or black, rich or poor, man or woman, and although we are powerless at times, we can modify the result to some extent, and shape who the self is. Also, the self involves more active involvement in its development, acutally interacting with and describing itself within the communities; just labelling itself as something is not enough for it to exist.
In relation to Lyotard’s self in “The Self We Live By,” the authors write, “Where does such a self [discursive / fractured] stand in relation to truth and authenticity? Certainly, postmodern narratives of self cannot be evaluated in terms of their universal truth value; they can only be truths in relation to ‘interpretive communities,’ as Stanley Fish (1980) might put it.” (70)
Here, I believe the point being made is that you must talk about yourself (using personal pronouns) in relation to the community to which you belong and must interact with that community, and in doing so, you give yourself substance and a reality in that community. From Baudrillaud’s argument, there is no separation between something’s representation and what it is, therefore it may not exist beyond its representation. In a culture where we can look at images and say “that’s me,” makes defining one’s self too easy and representational, rather than real. However, if the self lies within an actual community and is recognized by the community, not just defined by the person who thinks their self belongs there, then the self actually has substance. The act of using “language games” to discuss who we are in relation to these nodal points is what allows us to make the self a reality, not just a fake “hyperreal” self that has no substance. Then, it the combinations and intersections of these identities that help us define who we are, as no one explanation of the identity can lie alone.
Therefore, within my own field, if I wish to define who myself is, I can’t just adopt the image of another scientist or student and believe that that is who I am. I must think about and discuss where I am within multiple different communities which may interact to produce who I am. This definition of myself cannot just be formulated in the mind, but must also interact and discuss with the communities to which it ascribes, or it will not truly exist and will be nothing more than a representation of what I would like to think that it is. I must perform experiments and come to conclusions and then discuss my actions and self with others within the scientific community to be a part of that community, and must do the same with every other community to which I believe I exist. At the same time, this definition of my self is not stagnant, but is dynamic and ever changing, and must continually contribute to different communities to keep its reality alive. The self that exists within the scientific community and U of M student body today, need not exist tomorrow.
This is my understanding of what is meant by the question, “Where does such a self [discursive / fractured] stand in relation to truth and authenticity?” Although I have tried to analyze it and myself in relation to this question, I am not terribly sure that I have gotten the idea right. If you believe that I am off base, please tell me! Like I have said in previous blogs, the concepts of the self are confusing to me, and I’d like to know if I need to redefine my understanding of these concepts.
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Wow!
ReplyDeleteWhat an in-depth analysis. You dialogue well with some really tough concepts. I particularly like this statement: "In a culture where we can look at images and say “that’s me,” makes defining one’s self too easy and representational, rather than real. However, if the self lies within an actual community and is recognized by the community, not just defined by the person who thinks their self belongs there, then the self actually has substance."
Baudrillard sticks for me in a way that I find difficult to describe. If the images present the images, and thus the hyper-reality is the representation, then I experience something like the rhetorical equivalent of looking into a hall of mirrors. I have to admit, I find the notion of interpretive communities particularly helpful in settling that anxiety. At the same time, as individuals live across time zones, religions, countries, classes, and educational experiences, moving in and out of the communities where they are recognized and where their knowledges are constructed, I wonder if the "interpretive communities' is enough...??